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False Advertising
(continued from page 65)
feasible absent the class action.
Thus, the class action would allow
the individuals to have their day in
court.
Kalina M. Tulley
Iowa Consumer Fraud
Act Prohibits Earning
Money By Referrals
Rather Than By Product
Sales
In State of Iowa v. Santa Rosa
Sales and Marketing, Inc., 475
N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1991), the Iowa
Supreme Court held that the Iowa
Consumer Fraud Act prohibited a
company from earning money by
engaging in referral sales, which
motivate buyers to become sales-
persons and recruit others, rather
than by generating the sales of
products. The court also held that
the company deceived its brokers
and salespersons by misrepresent-
ing the legality of its silver coin
sales program.
Background
Santa Rosa Sales and Market-
ing, Inc. ("Santa Rosa") is a Cali-
fornia corporation engaged nation-
wide in selling contracts for Silver
Eagle coins. The coins are United
States currency with a face value of
one dollar that Santa Rosa offered
at three for $80 or twenty for $500.
The coins are also sold nationally
in coin shops, banks, and over
cable television for prices ranging
from $6 to $65 per coin. Charles R.
Groeschel ("Groeschel") was San-
ta Rosa's founder, chairman of the
board, former president, and per-
son responsible for marketing pro-
cedures. Groeschel and his wife
were the sole shareholders of Santa
Rosa.
Santa Rosa's sales were made by
brokers or salespersons who sold
contracts; purchasers of contracts
could become brokers or salesper-
sons themselves. Brokers were dis-
tinguished from salespersons in
that brokers received training and
ongoing continuing education
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from Santa Rosa, but salespersons
did not. Brokers were contractual
employees who were required to
comply with Santa Rosa's written
policies. After a broker completed
a presentation, prospective clients
were given the opportunity to buy
coins or sign up to be salespersons.
First-time purchasers bought
one or more starter contracts at a
cost of either $80 or $500. The
purchase agreement for those
choosing to become salespeople
contained a provision requiring
twelve completed sales of coin con-
tracts before they would be paid.
Salespersons who did not sell
twelve completed coin contracts
within thirty days were removed
from the referral program, and the
initial $80 or $500 payment be-
came a direct purchase of the
coins. Purchasers of coin contracts
were given the option to never take
possession of the coins. In theory,
Santa Rosa bought back the coins
that purchasers never received, re-
sold them, and then sent the pur-
chasers cash. Eighty-five percent of
Iowans who purchased contracts
opted not to take possession of the
coins.
ANNOUNCEMENT
Top Consumer Scams
of 1991
The Alliance Against Fraud in
Telemarketing has published a list
of the top ten consumer scams in
1991 in the United States. In order,
they are:
1. Postcard Guaranteed Prize
Offers
2. Advance Fee Loans
3. Fraudulent 900 Number Pro-
motions
4. Precious Metal Investment
Schemes
5. Toll Call Fraud (Con artists
use binoculars to read calling card
numbers of travelers placing long-
distance phone calls from airports
and train stations.)
6. Headline Grabbers (For ex-
ample, thousands of people agreed
to let military personnel use their
long distance calling card numbers
to call back to the United States.)
7. Direct Debit from Checking
Accounts
8. Phony Yellow Page Invoices
9. Phony Credit Card Pro-
motions
10. Collectors' Items
See Alliance Against Fraud in
Telemarketing, Fall, pp. 1-2 (1991).
Trial Court
The State of Iowa sued Santa
Rosa alleging that the company
violated Iowa's Consumer Fraud
Statute, Iowa Code 714.16 (1987),
by committing unlawful practices
of: (1) referral sales; (2) misrepre-
sentations; (3) violations of the
Door-to-Door Sales Act, Iowa
Code ch. 82; and (4) violations of
the lottery statute, Iowa Code
725.12 (1987).
The District Court, Polk Coun-
ty, Iowa enjoined Santa Rosa's
marketing program and held the
company liable for a restitution
fund of $196,463 to be adminis-
tered by the State. The court or-
dered Iowa to make restitution to
Santa Rosa consumers from the
fund and deposit any remainder
with the Iowa Consumer Educa-
tion and Litigation Fund. Addi-
tionally, the court assessed a civil
penalty and prejudgment interest
and held Groeschel personally lia-
ble. Santa Rosa appealed to the
Iowa Supreme Court.
Statute Prohibits Referral Sales
Although the statutory language
of the Iowa Consumer Fraud Stat-
ute does not contain the word
referral, the Iowa Supreme Court
has interpreted 714.16(2)(b) as
prohibiting referral sales. General-
ly in a referral sales program, the
seller represents that the buyer's
purchase price will be reduced or
that the buyer will receive a com-
mission by referring other pros-
pects to the seller. Santa Rosa
argued that its program was not an
illegal referral sales plan because a
salesperson's compensation was
determined by the sale of coins and
not by the recruitment of other
salespersons.
However, consumer testimony,
broker training materials, sales
documents, and actual broker pre-
sentations, combined with data
showing that only a fraction of
Iowa purchasers opted to take Sil-
ver Eagle coins, established that
Iowa purchasers were not motivat-
ed by the desire to own Santa
Rosa's Silver Eagle coins, but rath-
er, to make easy money by recruit-
ing others. Therefore, the supreme
court affirmed the trial court's con-
clusion that Santa Rosa's money-
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making objective was the type of
referral sales program the Iowa
legislature wanted to prohibit.
Santa Rosa's Misrepresentations
The court then turned to the
issue of misrepresentation of po-
tential earnings and the program's
legality. Santa Rosa admitted that
certain brokers misrepresented the
dollar amounts purchasers could
earn. However, Santa Rosa argued
that it was not responsible, because
"renegade brokers" made the mis-
representations. The supreme
court disagreed for two reasons.
First, broker training materials
contained assurances of quick and
easy money. Second, Santa Rosa
failed to develop a system to moni-
tor either the new brokers or their
training. Therefore, the supreme
court held that Santa Rosa could
not disclaim responsibility for the
misrepresentations of its brokers.
Santa Rosa also admitted that
its brokers misrepresented the pro-
gram's legality, but again denied
responsibility for renegade bro-
kers. The supreme court rejected
Santa Rosa's claim as meritless
and found the misrepresentations
traceable directly to Santa Rosa's
broker training materials. For ex-
ample, in a document entitled
"Questions Most Frequently
Asked About The Santa Rosa
Plan," the first question on the
document was "1. Q. Is this plan
legal? A. Yes!" However, Santa
Rosa made no attempt to deter-
mine whether its program was in
compliance with Iowa law until
four months after Santa Rosa sales
began. As a result of these misrep-
resentations, the Iowa Supreme
Court found Santa Rosa liable for
violating the state's Consumer
Fraud Act.
Remaining Issues
The supreme court partially re-
versed the trial court and held that
violations of the Door-to-Door
Sales Act and lottery statute were
not unfair practices as defined by
the Iowa consumer fraud statute.
The court reasoned that the legisla-
ture's failure to include violations
of the Act or lottery statute as
unfair practices revealed an intent
to exclude them.
Next, Santa Rosa argued that
since the restitution fund was de-
signed solely to reimburse Iowa
residents who made purchases
from Santa Rosa, the trial court
erred when it awarded the un-
claimed balance to the Iowa Con-
sumer Education and Litigation
Fund. The supreme court agreed
and directed the trial court on
remand to return any undistribut-
ed portion of the restitution fund
to Santa Rosa.
The court then turned to the
imposition of the civil penalty.
Santa Rosa contended that no pen-
alty should have been awarded
because renegade brokers violated
the law without Santa Rosa's con-
sent or encouragement. The su-
preme court concluded that Santa
Rosa impliedly authorized and en-
couraged the ideas and sales tech-
niques used by the brokers and
therefore, the civil penalty was
appropriate.
Next, the court examined the
personal liability of Santa Rosa's
owner, Groeschel. The supreme
court upheld the trial court finding
that Groeschel's liability arose as a
consequence of his complete con-
trol of Santa Rosa and his own
personal acts in perpetrating con-
sumer fraud.
Lastly, the supreme court held
that the award of prejudgment
interest was improper because the
state legislature intended to ex-
clude prejudgment interest from
the definition of restitution in the
consumer fraud statute.
Judy Koehler
Negligent Termite
Inspector Can Be Liable
To Forseeable
Subsequent Home
Purchasers
In Hosford v. State Termite and
Pest Control, Inc., 589 So. 2d 108
(Miss. 1991), the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that a pest control
operator, who negligently inspect-
ed residential property in the pro-
cess of being sold, may be liable to
forseeable subsequent purchasers
of the house.
Background
In 1986, Jim and Judy Hosford
("the Hosfords") hired McCrary
Real Estate, Inc. in an effort to buy
a home in Columbus, Mississippi.
On July 11, 1986, the Hosfords,
through the services of McCrary
Real Estate, agreed to purchase a
house and received the corre-
sponding warranty deed. For pro-
cedural purposes, title first was
transferred to Johnny Mack
McCrary ("McCrary"), principal
in McCrary Real Estate, who then
transferred the property to the
Hosfords.
Before the closing, McCrary con-
tacted State Termite and Pest Con-
trol, Inc. ("State Termite") and
requested an inspection of the prop-
erty for possible termite damage.
Steve McKissack ("the Inspector"),
a pest control specialist employed
by State Termite, performed an
inspection of the premises and pre-
pared a report stating the results.
The report listed Charles Smith as
the current owner of the property
and McCrary, individually, as the
purchaser. The report was one of
the documents submitted at the
closing of the property purchase in
July, 1986.
The Inspector's report stated
that there was no infestation or
damage from wood-destroying in-
sects on the property. The inspec-
tion covered the readily accessible
areas of the property, but did not
include areas that were obstructed
or inaccessible at the time of in-
spection. The report also stated
that it was not a structural damage
report nor a warranty as to the
absence of wood-destroying in-
sects.
In January, 1988, nineteen
months after the inspection, Jim
Hosford noticed conditions sug-
gesting termite infestation and
damage. He had the property in-
spected by a carpenter and, later,
by two employees of the Pest Con-
trol Section of the United States
Department of Agriculture. These
parties reported substantial ter-
mite infestation and damage that
had existed for more than two
years and possibly as long as fifteen
years. The parties also agreed that
the damage should have been dis-
covered if the recent, June, 1986
inspection by State Termite had
been performed competently.
(continued on page 68)
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